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A Discussion of the Taylor Rule
By David Doran and Ro ´na ´n Hickey*
Abstract
Monetary policy rules have been advocated as a mechanism to increase the
transparency, accountability and consistency of the monetary policy decision-
making process. These rules range from simple unconditional to more
complicated feedback rules. In the case of the latter the policy instrument is
determined by developments in underlying factors. The most prominent example
of a feedback rule is the Taylor rule, which provides a simple estimate of the
appropriate stance of monetary policy given an economy’s inflation rate and the
output gap. It can also be used ex-post in a descriptive capacity, providing an
account of how a central bank has responded to economic developments in the
past.
There is much debate as to how a Taylor rule should be operationalised.
Amongst other things, this reflects issues over the data included, the use of
interest rate smoothing techniques and the correct values that should be placed
on the coefficients in the rule. Reflecting these issues different Taylor rules
produced for an individual economy can provide very different policy
prescriptions. As a result, they should be interpreted with caution. Bearing this in
mind, however, the paper reviews the recent changes in monetary policy in the
major economies relative to the Taylor rule.
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responsibility of the authors and are not necessarily those held by the CBFSAI or the ESCB. The authors would like to thank Gerard O’Reilly,
Maurice McGuire, Rafique Mottiar and Tom O’Connell for their comments and suggestions.A Discussion of the
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1. Introduction
There has been much debate about the
usefulness of policy rules in the setting of
monetary policy. A monetary policy rule places
a restriction on the discretionary policy options
that policymakers might be disposed to follow.
As a result, such policy rules have been
advocated as a mechanism to increase the
transparency, accountability and consistency of
monetary policy decisions. The second half of
the twentieth century saw the development of
important economic insights — the Lucas
critique, rational expectations and the time
inconsistency of policy — which considered the
benefits of policymakers following such a rule.
Various forms of rules have been suggested,
ranging from simple unconditional rules —
such as keeping the rate of money growth
constant — to more complicated conditional or
feedback rules. In the case of the latter, the
policy instrument is determined by
developments in underlying factors. The most
prominent example of a feedback policy rule is
the Taylor rule. Introduced by Stanford
economist John Taylor in 1993, the rule has
become extremely popular. It has both
normative and descriptive functions. In regard
to the former, it provides a simple measure of
the appropriate stance of monetary policy,
taking inflation and the output gap into
account. In the case of the latter it can also be
used ex-post to assess how a central bank has
responded to these variables in the past.
The purpose of this article is to introduce the
Taylor rule and outline some important issues
related to it. It is intended to be informative and
educational, but does not represent the views
of any actual policy makers. The article is
organised as follows: Section 2 takes a brief
look at the development of monetary policy
rules and provides a more detailed look at the
Taylor rule itself. Section 3 focuses on three
important issues related to the rule — data
complications, interest rate smoothing and
coefficient weightings. Section 4 illustrates
Taylor rules recently produced by the
International Monetary Fund and uses them to
assess broad trends in monetary policy over
the last decade. Finally Section 5 concludes.
The article also includes a Box, which provides
more information on the monetary policy ‘rules
versus discretion’ debate.
2. Monetary policy rules and the
Taylor rule
The concept of a monetary policy rule is not a
modern idea. In their extensive survey of the
subject, Asso et al. (2007) note that it was in
the early nineteenth century that ‘for the first
time the importance of monetary policy being
rule-guided acquired a great practical and
institutional importance’. An early example of a
monetary policy rule is the British gold
standard, adopted in response to high inflation.
In the first half of the twentieth century simple
unconditional policy rules were favoured by
many economists, the most prominent of which
was proposed by Milton Friedman. Friedman
advocated a monetary policy rule, the k%
money growth rule, which aimed to keep the
rate of monetary growth constant (outlined in
detail in Friedman (1960)). This simple rule
called for the monetary authority to avoid sharp
swings in policy by adopting publicly the policy
of achieving a steady rate of growth in a
specified monetary aggregate. The rate of
increase ‘should be chosen so that on average
it could be expected to correspond with a
roughly stable long-run level of final product
prices’. Given the long run historical trend,
Friedman argued that a growth rate of 3 to 5
per cent per year would correspond with this
objective.
As Box 1 outlines, it was not until the 1970s
and 1980s that the benefits of a monetary
policy rule were more fully developed. This was
in response to the substantial rise in inflation
during the 1970s. During this period the type of
policy rule being proposed moved away from
simple unconditional rules of Friedman’s kind,
with conditional or feedback rules increasingly
favoured instead. In a feedback rule the policy
instrument responds to changes in underlying
economic variables such as the inflation rate
and unemployment. An early example is a rule
devised by McCallum (1987), who suggested
that the monetary growth rate should be
adjusted in response to changes in the velocity
of the monetary base and the divergence of
nominal GNP from a target path. In 1993
Stanford economist John Taylor introduced aA Discussion of the
Taylor Rule
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Box 1: Time inconsistency and the monetary policy ‘rules versus discretion’ debate
The twentieth century experienced a lively debate over whether monetary policy
should be rules-based or discretionary. Prior to the 1970s there was a broad
consensus that a discretionary policy was the better one, despite arguments in
favour of policy rules advanced by Simons (1936) and Friedman (1960),
amongst others. As Dwyer (1993) notes, there was a view during this period that
‘discretion could be used to produce the same values of the policy instruments
as would be feasible with any restriction’. However, during the 1970s the US
economy experienced a period of sustained high inflation. This period, known as
the Great Inflation, raised question marks over the ability of discretionary policy
to keep price pressures in check, and led to a renewed interest in monetary
policy rules. Against this backdrop, the view that a discretionary policy would
always outperform a policy rule was challenged by the view that economic
performance could be improved by committing to a policy rule.
This conclusion emerged from the seminal work
of Kydland and Prescott (1977) on the so-
called time inconsistency of economic policy.
Kydland and Prescott showed that policies
made on a discretionary basis were likely to
result in a worse outcome than if policymakers
committed to follow a policy rule. As the term
suggests, time inconsistency occurs when
policymakers are inconsistent in their decisions
over different periods. Once it is assumed that
private agents’ expectations are made
rationally, it is easy to see how this can occur.
Given the key role that expectations play in
determining behaviour it is in the interest of
policymakers to commit in advance to a certain
policy to control these expectations. In the
case of monetary policy, for example,
policymakers may announce that they intend to
keep inflation low. When the time for policy
action comes about, however, with
expectations having already been set, it is
feasible for policymakers to renege on the
promised action and to take a different course.
They may decide to create ‘surprise inflation’,
for example, in order to boost employment and
economic output. By lowering interest rates
policymakers can move employment above its
long run natural rate temporarily as workers
consider increases in nominal wages to equate
to increases in real wages.
However, such misperceptions will not continue
as higher inflation erodes real incomes.
Rational agents know that this incentive exists
and so the initial monetary policy commitment
may not be credible. Accordingly, inflation
expectations — and future inflation — will
increase. For example, wage earners will
expect higher inflation and require higher
wages to compensate for this. Businesses will,
in turn, have to raise prices to keep their
margins intact. Against this backdrop it is easy
to see how a general inflationary environment
could quickly emerge and strengthen. In a
scenario where a policy rule meant that the
initial commitment to low inflation was credible,
by comparison, the outcome would be a lower
inflation rate. The latter outcome is clearly
superior to the first. There would be no
difference in the unemployment rate between
the two situations since there would be no
surprise inflation.
This analysis, and further work by Barro and
Gordon (1983) amongst others, highlighted the
importance of credibility in policy making. The
benefits of a rules-based framework and of
independent central banks were two of the
developments to emerge from this literature.A Discussion of the
Taylor Rule
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simple feedback rule, which has become very
popular. The Taylor rule is a simple formula that
can be used to assess how a central bank’s
interest rate should respond to changes in the
inflation rate and activity levels, given the
economy’s inflation target and level of potential
output. This normative function of the rule
provides a simple assessment of the desirable
path of interest rates given underlying
developments. When introducing the rule,
Taylor (1993) showed that deviations in these
key economic variables from their target levels
provided a ‘remarkable’ explanation for Federal
Reserve policy decisions over the period 1987
to 1992. Hence, the rule can also be used ex-
post in a descriptive capacity, providing an
account of how a central bank has responded
to economic developments in the past.
Taylor’s original formula takes the form:
i = r + π* + 1.5(π -π*) + 0.5(y − y*) (1)
where;
i is the interest rate suggested by the rule;
r is the equilibrium value of the natural real
interest rate;
π* is the central bank’s inflation target;
π is the actual inflation rate;
y is the level of output, y* is the potential
level of output, and y − y* is the output
gap.
The formula therefore, suggests that a central
bank’s policy rate should be determined by
four factors:
• The natural real interest rate (r);
• The central bank’s inflation target (π*);
• The inflation rate (π);
• The deviation of output from its potential
level (y — y*).
Taylor assumed that the Federal Reserve had
an unofficial inflation target of 2 per cent (π* =
2) and that the US natural real interest rate —
the interest rate that is consistent with output
being at its potential level and stationary
inflation — was also 2 per cent (r* = 2).
Accordingly, the original Taylor rule assumed
an equilibrium nominal interest rate of about 4
per cent for the US economy. The other two
factors — the deviation of the inflation rate from
its target and the divergence of output from its
potential level — determine how the interest
rate should adjust in the short term. If the
inflation rate is above its target, or the output
gap is positive, for example, the Taylor rule
recommends that the policy rate should be set
above its equilibrium rate. If, on the other hand,
the inflation rate is below its target, or the
output gap is negative, the Taylor rule
recommends that the policy rate should be
below its equilibrium value.
Taylor placed a higher coefficient on the
deviation of inflation from its target (1.5) then
on the deviation of output from its potential
(0.5). This reflects the so called ‘Taylor
principle’; the coefficient on the deviation of
inflation from its target should be greater than
unity to ensure that real interest rates increase
in response to higher inflation. If this coefficient
were less than unity an increase in the inflation
rate would lead to a higher nominal interest
rate, but a lower real interest rate. Hence, it
would not be effective in curbing demand and
reducing inflation. A coefficient of 1.5 means
that for every percentage point that the inflation
rate is above its target, the Taylor rule suggests
that the central bank should raise its nominal
policy interest rate by 1.5 per cent, thus raising
the real interest rate.
As McCallum (2000a) has noted, central banks
are unlikely to follow a mechanical formula in
setting monetary policy. So why has the Taylor
rule remained so popular? Taylor himself
acknowledged that ‘operating monetary policy
by mechanically following a policy rule is not
practical’ when introducing the rule in his 1993
paper. However, he suggested that his policy
rule could be made operational in two ways.
The first was for the Federal Reserve to use his
rule as one of the many inputs analysed when
deciding on the appropriate stance of monetary
policy. The second was for policymakers to use
the ‘fundamental properties’ of the rule to guide
policy setting, rather than following the actual
formula very precisely. The fundamental
requirement of the Taylor rule is that interest
rates should be increased when inflationary
pressures are rising and economic growth isA Discussion of the
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above potential, and should be decreased
when inflationary pressures are diminishing and
economic growth falls below potential. As
Taylor put it ‘this characterisation gives only the
signs of the response coefficients of the policy
rule. Rather than specifying the magnitudes of
the coefficients, it states that the magnitudes
should depend on the sensitivity of aggregate
demand to interest rates’. Outside of
policymakers, amongst analysts and
commentators, much of the Taylor rule’s
popularity comes from its simplicity, which
appears to make the measurement of whether
monetary policy is too tight or too loose a
relatively straightforward exercise.
3. Some issues related to the
Taylor rule
3.1 Data issues and the Taylor rule
As noted in Section 2, the Taylor rule provides
a relatively straightforward method of
estimating the appropriate stance of monetary
policy. However, a number of data issues exist
which complicate the rule’s construction
somewhat and raise uncertainties. One of these
is the significant degree of judgement that is
required when producing a Taylor rule. Two of
the variables in Equation (1) are unobservable
and a number of alternative techniques can be
used to calculate them. This can result in a
range of different estimates of the variables at
any one time. A 2006 ECB Monthly Bulletin
Article on monetary policy activism highlights
the potential divergence in Taylor rule
measurements that this can cause. It presents
a range of Taylor rules using different statistical
measures. Between 1999 and mid-2006 the
range of the required short-term policy rate
based on these indicators spans from 50 basis
points to 400 basis points at its widest.
The first of the unobservable variables is the
natural real interest rate. A common approach
used to proxy its value is to calculate its long-
run historical value based on the ex-post
difference between nominal interest rates and
realised inflation, and this is the path followed
by Taylor in his original work. Other
approaches involve using some statistical
methods or a structural model to ascertain its
value.
The second unobserved variable in Equation
(1) is the output gap. A sizeable literature
exists regarding the measurement of the output
gap, including whether it should be estimated
from a structural model or using a more
mechanical method such as statistical filters.
Orphanides and van Norden (1999) note that
the reliability of output gap estimates in real
time tends to be quite low and using different
methods to calculate output gaps can generate
estimates that differ markedly in both number
and sign. They find that the most significant
factor behind ex-post revisions of output gaps
is not the revision of published data, but rather
the extra information that the subsequent
evolution of the economy provides about the
current position in the business cycle.
Caution is recommended by some
commentators as regards the nature of the
estimated data that is used in the calculation of
a Taylor rule. Orphanides (1998) notes that,
when policy rules are used to analyse historical
decision-making, they often ignore the potential
for subsequent heavy revisions. Measures of
the output gap are particularly prone to such
revisions. Using the Taylor rule, Orphanides
finds that an assessment of policy
recommendations for the US economy during
the downturn in the 1970s differs considerably
depending on whether real time data or ex-post
revised data are used. More specifically,
policymakers believed that US potential output
was much stronger in the 1970s than actually
turned out to be the case. Nelson (2001) finds
that a similar overstatement appears to have
occurred in the UK in the 1970s. This suggests
that an inadequate concern for inflation may
not have been as significant a cause of the
Great Inflation as is often suggested.
Orphanides et al (1999) confirm the significant
impact of measurement errors and conclude
that ‘successful monetary policy design needs
to be founded on realistic informational
assumptions about what policymakers can and
do know when policy decisions are being
made’.
A further data issue relates to the use of
forward-looking data. The original Taylor rule
used a contemporaneous measure of inflation
in its construction. It is now commonlyA Discussion of the
Taylor Rule
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accepted, however, that a change in interest
rates today will not affect the current rate of
inflation, but rather the rate in the future. In
other words, monetary policy operates with a
lag, and the maximum effect is felt typically
more than a year after the policy change. This
explains the medium-term outlook of most
central banks. Accordingly, a monetary
authority is likely to use forecasts of inflation
rather than the current actual inflation rate
when setting the appropriate policy rate and
the Taylor rule should incorporate such a
measure of expected inflation in its calculation.
This entails a third unobservable variable in
Equation (1). Batini and Haldane (1998)
highlight the benefits of incorporating forward-
looking data in policy rules; such rules better
control for the effects of monetary transmission
lags and ensure that policy is responsive to the
most timely information, features that allow
better inflation and output control. Work by
Clarida, Gali and Gertler (1997, 1999), amongst
others, estimate forward-looking monetary
policy reaction functions for many of the G7
countries. In a euro area context, a recent
paper by Gorter, Jacobs and de Haan (2007)
concludes that the ECB takes expected
inflation into account when setting interest
rates. They find that the coefficient on inflation
is greater than unity — obeying the Taylor
principle — when forward looking data is used,
consistent with the ECB’s goal of price stability.
3.2 Interest rate smoothing
Another important issue highlighted by the
literature is interest rate smoothing; the process
where central banks adjust their policy rate in
an incremental manner towards their desired
level as opposed to adjusting the rate in one
large movement. Brainard (1967) was the first
to urge caution in policymaking, highlighting
the uncertainties that exist. Subsequent
literature has focused on whether central banks
smooth interest rates and why they might
chose to do so. Peersman and Smets (1998),
amongst many others, suggest that central
banks do smooth interest rates and only
gradually move towards the policy rate
suggested by a Taylor rule. Coupled with
adequate communication, such a measured
path avoids a sudden large interest rate shock
and hence the interest rate path is better
understood. Given the uncertainty regarding
data timeliness, interest rate smoothing may be
preferable to larger single rate adjustments as
it allows the central bank to learn as it adjusts
and to observe the reaction of the private
sector to its adjustments. Woodford (1999)
shows that inertial policy, or gradual
adjustment, can be optimal as small but
persistent changes in short-term interest rates
in response to shocks allow a larger effect of
monetary policy on long term interest rates and
hence upon aggregate demand, for a given
degree of overall interest rate variability.
Rudebusch (2002, 2005) offers a contrasting
explanation, however, suggesting that
smoothing does not take place and that the
illusion of such inertia may in fact reflect
spuriously omitted persistent influences on
policy. Rudebusch’s arguments are, however,
questioned by Castelnuovo (2003) who
believes that interest rate smoothing is
observable on the basis of the robustness of
his findings across different specifications of
the Taylor rule.
3.3 Empirical estimates of central banks’
coefficient weights
Estimated Taylor rules seek to characterise how
central banks historically changed policy rates
in response to inflation developments and
output gaps. The results of such analyses show
that the way in which central banks conduct
monetary policy can differ markedly across
countries and regimes. A key feature of this
area of the literature is ascertaining whether
central banks, whether deliberately or
inadvertently, adhered to the Taylor principle; is
the co-efficient on the inflation variable in the
Taylor rule greater than unity? As noted in
Section 2 this ensures that real interest rates
increase as required in response to higher
expected inflation relative to the target.
With respect to US monetary policy, Clarida,
Gali and Gertler (1999) find that the Fed has
responded differently to deviations of inflation
from its target, depending on the time period
examined. In particular, they find the estimated
value for the inflation co-efficient is below unity
for the pre-Volcker period — when inflation was
high — and far greater than one for the
Volcker-Greenspan period up to the mid-1990s.
Hence, during the 1970s the Fed violated theA Discussion of the
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so-called Taylor principle. The authors argue
that this contributed to the inability of the Fed
to combat the Great Inflation of the 1970s. A
similar result is given by Hetzel (2000), who
notes that the FOMC has done a better job
since 1980 of controlling inflation because it
became more aggressive in responding to
realised inflation. Complementary work by Judd
and Rudebusch (1998) finds that the Fed
Funds rate during the Greenspan era appears
to have reacted about twice as strongly to the
output gap as Taylor assumed and it appears
to have moved gradually, rather than
instantaneously, into rough accord with the
Taylor rule.
A somewhat contrasting picture is given by
Orphanides (2003), who suggests that policies
pursued during the Great Inflation do not
appear to be obviously flawed; rather
policymakers were responding to inaccurate
real time estimates of the output gap. While
subsequent revisions to the data might now
show that the economy was overheated at the
time, when actual policy decisions were being
made such overheating was not clear. Indeed,
Orphanides finds that Federal Reserve policy
appears to have responded strongly to inflation
forecasts over the period. He contends that this
contrasts sharply with other work (such as
Clarida et al above) that suggests that Fed
policymakers responded to inflation
insufficiently strongly for economic stability
during the Great Inflation.
Some studies focus on cross-country
comparisons of monetary policy reactions,
including Clarida, Gali and Gertler (1997) who
report estimates of monetary policy reaction
functions for two sets of countries: the G3
(Germany, Japan and US) and the E3 (UK,
France and Italy). They find that since 1979
each of the G3 central banks pursued a
monetary policy strategy that adhered to the
Taylor principle. The primary driver of monetary
policy changes in those countries appears to
have been in response to inflation
developments with rates adjusting to the output
gap by a small amount. The reaction to
changes in inflation is lower for the E3
countries than the G3 countries, by
comparison. Work by McCallum (2000b)
compares alternative monetary policy rules
across the US, UK and Japan. For the US, all
of McCallum’s rules would have called for
tighter monetary policy during the 1970s, again
suggesting that the policy rate was set too low
and that the Taylor principle was not adhered
to. For the UK, the various rules suggest the
monetary policy was much too loose in the
1970s, but there is some disagreement with
regard to later years; the monetary base-
instrument rules suggest that policy was also
too loose during the middle and late 1980s
whereas the interest-instrument rule does not.
Finally in Japan most of the examined rules
indicate that policy was too tight in 1998, but
the monetary base rules suggest excessive
tightness for the entire period 1990-1998, while
the interest rate rules do not.
Focusing on the euro area, adherence to the
Taylor principle is identified in work by
Gerdesmeier, Mongelli and Roffia (2007) and
Gorter, Jacobs and de Haan (2007). The
former estimate a standard Taylor rule with
interest rate smoothing for the euro area, the
US and Japan, using a three-month interest
rate. They find that the euro area is the only
economy where the Taylor principle has been
fulfilled since 1993. Sauer and Sturm (2003), by
comparison, find that while the ECB’s inflation
coefficient is greater than the output coefficient
it does not exceed one. In other words, the
ECB moves in response to changes in inflation
but does not increase nominal rates sufficiently
to keep the real interest rate from declining. It
should be noted, however, that the sample
period in this study is somewhat narrow, given
the ECB had been setting policy rates for less
than four-years when the paper was published.
Finally, the Taylor rule has been criticised for
being too simplistic a measure, as it does not
encapsulate all of the relevant information
needed to conduct monetary policy in its two
variables, inflation and the output gap. Central
banks may have other objectives, such as the
maintenance of financial stability or an
exchange rate objective, which are not
encapsulated by specific variables in the Taylor
rule. Alternative variables have been included
in some augmented Taylor rules to try to
enhance the information properties of the ruleA Discussion of the
Taylor Rule
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to better reflect the broader considerations of
central banks. These include the addition of
other production or monetary variables to try to
encapsulate a fuller analysis.
For example, Gerdesmeier, Mongelli and Roffia
(2007) estimate a specification of the Taylor
rule for the euro area where a monetary
variable is added, as per the two-pillar
strategy. This continues to exhibit the presence
of the Taylor principle, yet the result for the
monetary term is surprisingly negative.
Gerlach-Kristen (2003) presents an alternative
reaction function using a cointegration
approach and, in contrast to the traditional
Taylor rule, finds a significant role for the long
rate. The author’s results also support the
adherence to the Taylor principle in the euro
area, given that the coefficient on the inflation
variable is greater than one. It is possible,
however, to argue that this approach of
including additional variables in a Taylor rule is
unnecessarily complex without adding value.
For example, monetary aggregates might
provide additional information about
prospective inflation, but this should really be
already factored into forecasts of inflation.
Similarly, financial stability concerns should
also be factored into the forecast. At the
moment, for example, the impact of the
financial market crisis is being encapsulated in
lower growth forecasts.
4 Taylor rules in practice
It may be useful to illustrate simple Taylor rules
for the US and euro area economies. In this
section we focus on what these Taylor rules tell
us about monetary policy over the last decade,
and in particular about the response of the
ECB and the Federal Reserve to the financial
market turmoil and subsequent sharp downturn
in global economic activity.
4.1 Taylor rules for the US and the euro
area
Charts 1 and 2 illustrate Taylor rules for the US
and euro area economies for the years 2000 to
2009 along with the actual policy rates for each
economy over this period
1. These rules were
produced by the International Monetary Fund
(IMF) for April’s World Economic Outlook
2. With
regard to the data inputs, the natural real rate
of interest is a function of potential output
growth and varies over time as potential output
changes. The output gap is computed using a
model-based approach, rather than a statistical
filter, and one-year ahead consensus forecasts
provide a measure of expected inflation. As the
rules are produced for a number of advanced
economies under a uniform methodology, they
allow for a direct cross-country comparison of
the policy stance.
Before taking a closer look at the Taylor rules, it
is important to emphasise once again the
significant amount of judgement that is required
in their construction. As noted in the preceding
section, three of the inputs — the natural real
interest rate, the output gap and expected
inflation — are unobservable, and various
methodologies can be used to estimate their
values. There is also debate about the values
that should be placed on the coefficients in
Equation (1). As we have seen, these factors
can result in Taylor rules for individual countries
varying considerably and provides one of the
reasons why using a formula to mechanically
set policy is generally seen by policymakers as
inappropriate. Reflecting this uncertainty one
should not focus on specific point estimates
when analysing a Taylor rule, but rather use the
rule to determine broad trends. Based on the
IMF’s Taylor rules there are two such broad
trends. The first of these is that policy rates
were lower than the level suggested by the
Taylor rule for a period during the decade. The
second broad trend is that the response of the
ECB and Federal Reserve to the financial
market turmoil and subsequent economic
downturn has been appropriate when seen
through the lens of the Taylor rule.
1 The observation period in the charts is quarterly; the policy rate for
each quarter is computed by averaging the monthly policy rates.
2 The IMF does not directly illustrate its Taylor rule, but publishes
the deviation of the rule from the actual policy rate. As a result,
computing the Fund’s implicit rule is a straightforward exercise.A Discussion of the
Taylor Rule
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Chart 2: Taylor Rule for the Euro Area
The first of these trends receives support from
a number of other published Taylor rules. In the
case of the US, former St Louis Federal
Reserve President William Poole (2007) and
Taylor (2009) find that policy rates were below
those suggested by a Taylor rule during the
period mid-2002 to mid-2005 (although the gap
between the Taylor and policy rates in these
studies is narrower than the one illustrated in
Chart 1). Taylor suggests that the divergence
over this period provides an empirical
confirmation that monetary policy was too lax
between the years 2002 and 2005. He argues
that the resulting availability of cheap credit
was a factor in accelerating the US housing
boom and, accordingly, one of the early causal
factors behind the recent financial turmoil. For
the euro area, as mentioned in Section 3.1, an
article in the November 2006 ECB Monthly
Bulletin presents a range of Taylor rule
estimates using different statistical measures.
While this highlights the potential divergence in
Taylor rule measures, the actual policy rate was
below the mean of this range — and also
below the lower bound of the range — for
much of the period mid-2003 to mid-2005.
Noyer (2007) and Commerzbank (2007) also
find that a gap emerged between their Taylor
rule estimates and the policy rate in the middle
of the decade, although the gap is muchA Discussion of the
Taylor Rule
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smaller than in the case of the US. Both the
ECB article and Noyer stress, however, that
simple Taylor rules do not adequately take
account of the ECB’s two-pillar strategy. It is
also important to note that the monetary policy
stance may reflect risk factors that do not
impact on economic projections but are
significant enough to take note of. These
factors could include concerns about deflation,
financial stability and the geopolitical outlook,
all relevant factors early in the current decade.
Turning to the second broad trend, the IMF’s
Taylor rules suggest that, while they have been
somewhat different with respect to their initial
timing, the response of the ECB and Federal
Reserve to the global downturn has been
entirely appropriate. The initial difference
reflected the fact that the financial turmoil had
a much stronger impact on the US economy —
where it originated and where a sharp
adjustment in the housing market was already
taking place — at the outset. By comparison, it
took somewhat longer for the turmoil to impact
on real variables in the euro area and the rest
of the global economy. Since the impact has
spread and the global outlook has deteriorated
sharply, however, the ECB has cut its key
policy rate significantly. By June 2009 this main
refinancing rate had been reduced by a
cumulative 325 basis points and was at a
historical low of 1 per cent.
4.2 The zero bound and non-conventional
monetary policy
An issue that is particularly relevant in the
current environment, where central banks
globally have reduced policy rates to very low
levels, is the existence of a lower bound on
nominal interest rates, and the potential for a
liquidity trap to emerge
3. From Equation (1) we
can see that in an extremely bad economic
downturn the Taylor rule could be consistent
with nominal interest rates lower than zero. In
fact Rudebusch (2009) notes that recent FOMC
forecasts suggest that the US policy rate
should be negative this year. Against such a
backdrop, how should a central bank respond?
Mankiw (2009) and Buiter (2009) suggest that
3 The latter occurs when the liquidity in the market that has been
created by very low policy rates does not stimulate the economy
sufficiently; developments in the Japanese economy in the 1990s
provide an example of a liquidity trap in operation.
moving the nominal interest rate into negative
territory is possible. However, doing so would
require central banks taking extraordinary
actions raising question marks over its
practicality. Accordingly, as policy rates have
moved closer to the lower bound in the current
downturn, central banks have focused on non-
conventional monetary policies to provide extra
stimulus. Bini Smaghi (2009) defines these non-
conventional policies as ‘those policies that
directly target the cost and availability of
external finance to banks, households and non
financial corporations’. In the current episode
they have ranged from the provision of extra
liquidity and expanding eligible collateral to the
direct purchase of commercial paper,
commercial bonds and asset backed
securities.
5. Conclusions
Monetary policy rules have been employed
since the nineteenth century, but gained in
prominence in the late twentieth century as the
benefits of adopting a credible policy were fully
established. Over this period the type of policy
rule proposed has moved from simple
unconditional rules — such as Friedman’s k per
cent money growth rule — to conditional or
feedback policy rules. With the latter, the policy
instrument responds to changes in underlying
economic variables such as the inflation rate
and unemployment. The Taylor rule is an
example of a feedback monetary policy rule
that has become popular.
The Taylor rule can be used in a forward
looking mode — to assess the appropriate
stance of monetary policy — or in a backward
looking descriptive capacity to analyse past
policy decisions. With regard to the former,
given the significant level of judgement that is
involved in selecting the underlying
components of the Taylor rule, it clearly should
not be followed mechanically by policymakers.
Nevertheless, it can provide useful information
and accordingly can be used as one of the
many indicators analysed when a central bank
is setting policy rates. With regard to historical
policy developments, one should not focus on
specific point estimates when analysing a
Taylor rule, but rather use the rule to determine
broad observations. Over the past decadeA Discussion of the
Taylor Rule
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there would appear to be two of these. The first
is that global interest rates may have been too
low for a period in the middle of the decade,
particularly in the US. The second is that
central banks have responded aggressively to
the current economic downturn, a development
that Taylor rules suggest is appropriate. These
results should be interpreted with caution,
however. This not only reflects the judgement
issue outlined above, but also the failure of
mechanical policy rules to fully take account of
a central bank’s monetary policy strategy and
risk factors that may surround economic
projections.
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